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Abstract:  The  use  of  diplomatic  assurances  against  torture  and  other  ill-treatment  has 
increased  in  recent  years  in  response  to  the  continued  growth  of  international  terrorism. 
However, this practice is controversial because it engages the Contracting States’ obligation 
not to extradite or expel a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or 
she would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the 
receiving  State.  The  Strasbourg  Court’s  pragmatic  approach  suggests  that  in  certain 
circumstances,  following  an  analysis  of  the  quality  of  the  assurances  and  their  practical 
effect, diplomatic assurances can be adequate guarantees of safety. As a result, it will be 
argued that the Strasbourg Court cannot be accused of circumventing the absolute prohibition 
found in Article 3 ECHR by accepting the diplomatic assurances policy of the Contracting 
States. The author will conclude by arguing that the Strasbourg Court’s approach is effective 
as it reinforces the absoluteness of Article 3 ECHR while at the same time allowing States to 
protect their national security from terrorism. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper will examine the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court/the 
Strasbourg Court) to diplomatic assurances against torture and other ill-treatment. The first 
part of the paper will focus on the absolute nature of Article 3 European Convention on 
Human  Rights  (ECHR/the  Convention)  and  its  extraterritorial  effect.  The  ruling  of  the 
Strasbourg  Court  on  the  extraterritorial  nature  of  Article  3  ECHR  was  not  generally 
welcomed by the Contracting States and it was against this background that the Court has, in 
certain circumstances, accepted States’ use of diplomatic assurances. This acceptance has 
been criticised, however, for circumventing the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-
treatment on the basis that diplomatic assurances are inherently unreliable, as the second part 
of the paper will explore. However, the last part of the paper will demonstrate that the Court 
has  managed  to  combat  these  criticisms  by  taking  a  pragmatic  approach  to  diplomatic 
assurances. The Court assesses the reliability of the assurances based on their quality and 
their ability to eliminate the risk of torture and ill-treatment in practice. It considers these 
factors on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the circumstances of the case before it. 
Against this background, it can be argued that the assurances that have been accepted by the 
Strasbourg Court are effective guarantees against subjection to the proscribed treatment. As a 
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result, the paper will argue that the Court cannot be accused of circumventing the absolute 
prohibition to be found in Article 3 ECHR by accepting the use of diplomatic assurances by 
the Contracting States. Its approach, as the author will maintain, upholds the absolute nature 
of Article 3 ECHR and at the same time it allows States to protect their national security. 
 
B.  THE ABSOLUTE NATURE AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF 
ARTICLE 3 ECHR 
The main aim of this section is to examine the extraterritorial effect of Article 3 ECHR. This 
analysis is essential for the purposes of this paper as the issue of diplomatic assurances arises 
in cases which concern the extraterritorial effect of Article 3 ECHR. Given also that the 
nature of Article 3 ECHR is said to be compromised when assurances are used, it is necessary 
to look at the question of what absoluteness means in this context. 
1.  The absolute nature of Article 3 ECHR 
The most important feature of Article 3 ECHR concerns its nature. As the Strasbourg Court 
has stressed, ‘the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’.1 Unlike most of the substantive Articles of the Convention and of 
Protocols 1 and 4 to it, Article 3 ECHR makes no provision for exceptions.2 Article 3 ECHR 
is also non-derogable.3 While Article 15 ECHR permits the Contracting States to derogate 
from their obligations under the Convention in respect of the majority o f the Articles ‘[i]n 
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, there is no provision 
for derogation from Article 3 ECHR.4 It is therefore clear that diplomatic assurances must be 
reliable if they are to be used in the conte xt of Article 3 ECHR. Otherwise, their use will 
undermine the absolute nature of this provision. 
2.  The extraterritorial effect of Article 3 ECHR 
It is in the landmark case of Soering v the United Kingdom that the Strasbourg Court held that 
Article 3 ECHR can have an extraterritorial effect,5 in that Contracting States might be liable 
for acts that occur outside their jurisdiction. 6 This case concerned Jens Soering, a German 
fugitive, whose extradition from the United Kingdom was requested by the Government of  
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the United States of America on two counts of capital murder.7 Soering filed an application 
against the United Kingdom Government, inter alia, under Article 3 ECHR.8 He alleged that 
if he was to be extradited to the United States of America, there was a serious likelihood of 
being sentenced to death.9 He argued that exposure to the ‘death-row phenomenon’ would 
amount to being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment contrary to 
Article 3 ECHR.10 
The Strasbourg Court held that extraditing a person would give rise to liability under 
Article  3  ECHR  where  substantial  grounds  were  shown  for  believing  that  the  person 
concerned, if extradited, faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or other ill-treatment in 
the requesting country.11 The Court made clear that in such cases it is the responsibility of the 
sending Contracting State that is at issue and not that of the receiving State.12 This is because, 
the former has taken action ‘which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual 
to  proscribed  ill-treatment’. 13 The  Strasbourg  Court  in  applying  this  test  on  Soering’s 
circumstances concluded that his removal would constitute a breach of Article 3 ECHR.14 
a)  The requirements of the Soering test 
The Court will assess whether there are ‘substantial grounds’ for believing that the person 
concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the 
light of all the material placed before it or material obtained of its own motion.15 As regards 
the time at which the risk to the applicant should be assessed, the Strasbourg Court has 
repeatedly stated that in cases where the extradition or expulsion has not yet taken place ‘the 
material point in time is that of the Court’s consideration of the case’.16 In cases where the 
extradition or expulsion has already occurred ‘the existence of the risk must be assessed 
primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the 
Contracting State at the time of the expulsion’.17 However, ‘the Court is not precluded (…) 
from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to the expulsion’.18 
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As regards the standard of proof, the Strasbourg Court is satisfied that the risk of ill-
treatment is ‘real’ only when the foreseeable consequence of the Contracting State’s decision 
to extradite or expel the individual in issue is that he or she will be subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the receiving State.19 Even though the Court has never given a 
clear definition of the standard of proof, in the case of  Vilvarajah and others v the United 
Kingdom it clarified that ‘[a] mere possibility of ill-treatment (…) is not (…) sufficient to 
give rise to a breach of Article 3’.20 This statement can be taken, as Hemme Battjes has 
observed, as a negative definition of the standard of proof ‘in the sense that real risk is more 
than that’.21 
The Strasbourg Court, in examining the foreseeable consequences of the Contracting 
State’s decision to extradite or expel the applicant, takes into account a number of factors. 
The first is the general situation in the receiving State.22 This was considered by the Court in 
Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom.23 The Court held that their removal to Mogadishu would 
breach Article 3 ECHR as the level of violence there ‘was of sufficient intensity to pose a real 
risk of treatment reaching the Article 3 threshold to anyone in the capital’.24 The Court will 
also  consider  the  applicant’s  personal  situation.25 Gaforov  v  Russia  is  illustrative  on  this 
point.26 One of the factors  that was taken into account by the Court in concluding that 
substantial grounds had been shown for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of 
treatment  proscribed  by  Article 3  ECHR,  if  extradited  to  Tajikistan,  was  the personal 
situation of the applicant.27 Specifically, the Court took account of the fact that Gaforov was 
wanted by the Tajikistani authorities on account of his alleged participation in a transnational 
Islamic organisation and of the fact that supporters of this organisation were p ersecuted in 
Tajikistan.28 
In  the  noteworthy  case  of  Othman  (Abu  Qatada)  v  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
Strasbourg Court took into account a further factor, which is the focus of this paper.29 In that 
case, which concerned the planned expulsion of a Jordanian national to Jordan on grounds of 
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national security, the Court found that the applicant’s expulsion would not be in violation of 
Article  3  ECHR  since  the  United  Kingdom  Government  obtained  assurances  from  the 
Jordanian authorities that were sufficient to remove any real risk of ill-treatment.30 Thus, the 
issue  of  diplomatic  assurances  becomes  relevant  when  the  Strasbourg  Court  examines 
whether there exists a real risk for the applicant of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3 ECHR upon return.31 
b)  Assessing the ruling on the extraterritorial effect of Article 3 ECHR  – diplomatic 
assurances as a pragmatic response 
The decision of the Strasbourg Court that Article 3 ECHR has an extraterritorial effect can be 
criticised principally on two grounds. Firstly, it can be argued that since it is within the 
jurisdiction of the receiving State that the violation is anticipated to occur, the Contracting 
States have no responsibility whatsoever for this and it is therefore unfair to render them 
liable.32 This argument was put forward by the United Kingdom Government in  Soering.33 
Specifically, they contended that Article 3 ECHR should not impose responsibility on a 
Contracting  State  for  acts  which  occur  outside  its  jurisdiction. 34  However,  the  Court 
concluded that  such  a   consideration  ‘cannot  (…)  absolve  the  Contracting  Parties  from 
responsibility under Article 3 (…) for all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition 
suffered outside their jurisdiction’.35 Given that Article 3 ECHR enshrines one of the most 
fundamental values of democratic society, the serious and irreparable nature of torture and ill-
treatment  and  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  3  ECHR,  the  Court  could  reach  no  other 
conclusion.36 
Second, it might be argued that the Soering decision has a potentially negative impact 
on the national security of the Contracting States. The Court, by placing restrictions on the 
ability of the Contracting States to extradite and expel dangerous criminals has, according to 
the  United  Kingdom  Government  in  Soering,  obliged  the  Contracting  States  to  harbour 
criminals at the expense of their national security.37 The Court’s approach is indeed very 
strict,  as  it  disregards  the  legitimate  national  security  concerns  of  the  Contracting  States 
which have increased, especially in recent years, due to the continued growth of international 
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terrorism. In their attempts to combat terrorism and to protect their national security, several 
Contracting States, foremost among them the United Kingdom, have attempted to persuade 
the  Court  that  these  considerations  should  be  taken  into  account  in  deciding  whether  to 
remove a person.38 Despite these ‘strong assertions of national security considerations that 
have been presented by some European States’, the Court ‘has kept faith with the absolute 
nature of the prohibition to be found in Article 3’.39 The Court in reaffirming its view – that 
Article 3 ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society – has 
repeatedly  stated  that  the  Convention,  even  in  these  circumstances,  prohibits  in  absolute 
terms torture and other ill-treatment.40 
However, the Court, possibly as an acknowledgment of its unfair and strict approach, 
has accepted that Contracting States can enforce expulsions and extraditions without being 
liable under the Convention when they obtain sufficient assurances from the authorities of the 
receiving  States  to  the  effect  that  the  persons  concerned  will  not  be  subjected  to  the 
proscribed  treatment  upon  return. 41  Hence,  the  Court’s  acceptance  of  the  diplomatic 
assurances policy can be seen as a pragmatic response to these criticisms. 
 
C.  THE STRASBOURG COURT’S APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC 
ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND CRITICISMS 
1.  General principles – Saadi v Italy 
Although the Strasbourg Court had reviewed cases involving diplomatic assurances against 
torture and other ill-treatment prior to 2008, it was the landmark case of Saadi v Italy in 
which the Court set out the principles that guide its current approach to them.42 The case of 
Saadi  v  Italy  concerned  a  Tunisian  national  who  was  arrested  in  Italy  on  suspicion  of 
involvement in, inter alia, international terrorism.43 Though not convicted of any terrorist 
offences in Italy, he was convicted in absentia of terrorist offences by a military court in 
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Tunis.44 Italy ordered his expulsion to Tunisia on the grounds of national security and the 
international fight against terrorism.45 In doing so, the Italian authorities requested from the 
Tunisian  Government  diplomatic  assurances  that  if  the  applicant  were  to  be  expelled  to 
Tunisia he would not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.46 In the first note 
verbale, the Tunisian Government merely stated that it was prepared to ‘accept the transfer to 
Tunisia of Tunisians imprisoned abroad (…) in strict conformity with the national legislation 
in force and under the sole safeguard of the relevant Tunisian statutes’.47 In a second note 
verbale, the Tunisian Government confirmed that ‘the Tunisian laws in force guarantee and 
protect the rights of prisoners in Tunisia’ and that ‘Tunisia has voluntarily acceded to the 
relevant international treaties and conventions’.48 
The Strasbourg Court, at first, considered the quality of the assurances given and in 
particular, their content. It concluded that Tunisia’s assurances were insufficient because they 
were general and vague, they lacked explicit guarantees against ill-treatment, they made no 
reference at all to the protection of the applicant from the proscribed treatment, and they 
failed to specify the relevant international treaties and conventions.49 However, the Court 
then made clear that even the existence of specific and explicit assurances would not be 
sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill -treatment.50 Specifically, the 
Court stated that even if the Tunisian authorities had given the assurances that Italy had asked 
for, ‘that would not have absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such 
assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant 
would be protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention’.51 
In considering whether the assurances in issue provided, in their practical application, 
a sufficient guarantee of safety against the risk of ill-treatment, the Court paid due regard to 
the  general  situation  in  the  receiving  State.52 The Court in considering the human rights 
situation in Tunisia concluded that: 
the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing 
respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure 
adequate protection against the risk of ill -treatment where, as in the present case, 
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reliable  sources  have  reported  practices  resorted  to  or  tolerated  by  the  authorities 
which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention.53 
In considering these factors and the human rights record of Tunisia, the Strasbourg Court 
concluded that the risk of ill-treatment was not displaced by the assurances in issue. 54 As a 
result, the Court held that substantial grounds had been shown for believing that Saadi ran a 
real risk of being subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3 ECHR upon return to Tunisia 
and hence, that his expulsion would, if implemented, constitute a breach of Article 3 ECHR.55 
2.  Assessing the Strasbourg Court’s approach to assurances against torture and ill-
treatment 
What  emerges  from  the  Strasbourg  Court’s  approach  in  the  case  of  Saadi  is  that  the 
Contracting  States  cannot  satisfy  their  Article  3  ECHR  obligations  by  merely  obtaining 
specific and explicit assurances from the authorities of the receiving States that the applicants 
will not be subjected to the proscribed treatment. To put it in another way, what emerges 
from the Court’s approach in the case of Saadi is that ‘the mere fact of an assurance is no 
answer to the [C]ourt’s inquiry as to risk’.56 The Strasbourg Court in Saadi made it clear that 
in examining the foreseeable consequences of the Contracting State’s decision to extradite or 
expel the applicant, it will take into account not only the existence of an assurance, but also 
the general situation in the receiving State.57 Thus, the existence of an assurance, although an 
important factor which is considered by the Court, is just ‘one piece of this assessment’.58 It 
would be surprising if the Court considered solely the existence of an assurance in examining 
the foreseeable consequences  of the planned removal, especially when, as  in  the case of 
Saadi, reliable sources report widespread use of torture in the receiving State.59 
In addition, the Court’s approach in the case of Saadi suggests that it is the general 
situation in the receiving State that is determinative in assessing whether an applicant faces a 
real risk of ill-treatment and not the existence of an assurance.60 Therefore, in cases such as 
Saadi, where there is strong evidence by reliable sources that describes a disturbing situation 
in the country of destination, the existence of an assurance will carry little weight. In Saadi, 
for example, the assurances did not and would not, even if they were explicit and specific, 
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trump the other evidence.61 The Court also emphasised that diplomatic assurances  would be 
deemed  sufficient  only  in  situations  where  they  provide,  in  their  practical  application, 
effective protection against the risk of ill-treatment, demonstrating in this way that it is the 
practical effect of the assurances rather than the text of the assurances which matters most. 62 
In this way, the Court made clear that it would ‘look beyond the word of the receiving State’; 
in other words, its assurances; and that it would examine its actions.63 
The Court correctly concluded that it would deem as insufficient the assurances given 
when, as in the case of Saadi, reliable sources report that the authorities of the receiving State 
routinely use torture and that they are unwilling to investigate incidents of torture.64 This 
conclusion of the Court is to be welcomed as, against this background, the assurances given 
by the Tunisian authorities were essentially empty promises and would  not have protected 
Saadi against the risk of ill-treatment. Overall, the approach of the Court in the case of Saadi 
suggests  that  in  certain  circumstances,  even  if  these  circumstances  are  limited,  ‘it  may 
consider diplomatic assurances to be a sufficient guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment’.65 
The Court’s acceptance of this policy has not been welcomed however. The use of 
diplomatic assurances has been strongly criticised for circumventing the absolute prohibition 
of torture and other ill-treatment, given that, according to their opponents, assurances are 
unreliable, and therefore inadequate guarantees of safety against torture and ill-treatment.66 
The Council of Europe’s former Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, has argued 
that it is wrong to subject anyone to the risk of torture on the basis of a weak and informal 
undertaking.67 This hostility towards reliance on diplomatic assurances, on the ground that 
they are ineffective in practice is not unjustified,  given that assurances have proved to  be 
insufficient guarantees of safety in the past. 68 This was demonstrated by the notorious cases 
of Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v Sweden and Mohammed Alzery v Sweden.69 
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The former case concerned the expulsion of an asylum-seeker from Sweden to Egypt 
on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities.70 The United Nations Committee Against 
Torture (CAT) found that the assurances obtained by the Swedish Government from the 
Egyptian authorities were not sufficient to protect the individual in issue from the proscribed 
treatment, as the applicant had been tortured in Egypt. 71 In the latter case, Sweden expelled 
Alzery to Egypt in reliance on assurances of humane treatment.72 The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) likewise found that the assurances were not sufficient to protect the 
applicant as the applicant had also been subjected to the proscribed treatment in Egypt.73 As a 
result of these cases, human rights organisations (particularly Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty  International),  human  rights  advoc ates  (such  as  Thomas  Hammarberg)  and 
academics (such as Lena Skoglund) have opposed the use of diplomatic assurances on the 
basis that they are unreliable. 74 Human Rights Watch, for example, has claimed that these 
cases provide ‘the clearest illustration to date of the inherently flawed nature of diplomatic 
assurances’ and thus, that they should never be relied upon.75 
Concerns  about  the  use  of  assurances  are,  to  some  extent,  therefore  justified. 
However, this does not mean that diplomatic assurances are per se ineffective and that they 
should never be relied upon. Even though these cases have proved that diplomatic assurances 
may be sometimes ineffective, we should not, as Kate Jones has pointed out, ‘deduce from 
such  examples  a  general  proposition  that  assurances  against  torture  are  all  inherently 
unreliable’.76 This  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  assurances  that  were  accepted  by 
Sweden as adequate guarantees in these two cases did not meet some minimum standards of 
reliability. 
In the case of Agiza, the CAT found that as a result of Egypt’s reputation in using 
torture against detainees held for political and security reasons, Sweden knew or should have 
known at the time of the applicant’s removal that he would be at real risk of being subjected 
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to  torture.77 Against  this  background,  the  ‘procurement  of  diplomatic  assurances,  which, 
moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against 
this  manifest  risk’. 78 As  regards  the  case  of  Alzery,  the  HRC  likewise  found  that  the 
assurances obtained by the Egyptian authorities were not sufficient to protect the applicant as 
they  did  not  provide  for  enforcement  mechanism  nor  were  there  any  other  external 
arrangements that would have provided for effective implementation of the assurances.79 As a 
result, the HRC held that Sweden had failed to show that the diplomatic assurances were 
sufficient to eliminate the risk of ill-treatment.80 Therefore, the assurances that were accepted 
by Sweden failed to meet some minimum standards. Firstly, they could not in practical terms 
eliminate the serious risk of torture  and second, they did not  contain mechanisms for 
monitoring their enforcement. As a result, these cases cannot be used as a proof that 
diplomatic assurances are per se  unreliable. What these cases teach us  is that diplomatic 
assurances  should  be  treated  with  caution.  They  should  be  subjected  to  a  thorough 
examination and should meet certain minimum standards before one may conclude that they 
can be relied upon. 
This is, in essence, the approach that the Strasbourg Court adopts. The Court does not 
seem to agree with the absolute and prejudiced opinion of the majority that assurances are per 
se ineffective and, should therefore never be relied upon. Rather, the approach of the Court in 
Saadi  suggests  that  in  certain  circumstances  diplomatic  assurances  can  be  regarded  as  a 
sufficient guarantee of safety. They can be regarded as a sufficient guarantee when, after 
careful examination, they appear to fulfil certain criteria, namely when they reach a sufficient 
level of quality and, most importantly, when they provide a sufficient guarantee in practice.81 
The Court made it clear that it would subject the assurances in each case before it to a 
thorough examination and that it would take a pragmatic ap proach to them. In short, the 
Court will accept assurances only if they are reliable. Therefore, given that the assurances 
that are accepted by the Court are strikingly different from the assurances that were accepted 
by Sweden in the two notorious cases m entioned above, the Court cannot be accused of 
allowing diplomatic assurances to circumvent the absolute prohibition in Article 3 ECHR. By 
examining the jurisprudence of the Court in depth in the next section, it will become clear 
that the assurances that are accepted by the Court are indeed adequate guarantees of safety. 
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D.  EXAMINING THE STRASBOURG COURT’S CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING 
THE RELIABILITY OF ASSURANCES 
The Strasbourg Court assesses the reliability of assurances on a case-by-case basis and in 
light of all the circumstances of the case. It examines the quality of the assurances and, in 
particular, their scope and content. The Court takes a pragmatic approach as regards these 
assurances.  It examines whether, in their practical application, they can provide effective 
protection against the risk of ill-treatment. In doing so, the Court takes into account a wide 
range of factors. This section will examine these factors in depth and will demonstrate that, as 
a result of its pragmatic approach, the Court has managed to accept only those assurances that 
are adequate guarantees of safety. 
1.  Disclosure of the terms of the assurances to the Strasbourg Court 
The Strasbourg Court requires the Contracting States to disclose the terms of the assurances 
to  the  Court. 82 This  point  is  well -illustrated in  the case  of  Muminov  v  Russia,  which 
concerned the expulsion of the applicant from Russia to Uzbekistan.83 In that case, although 
the  respondent  Government  claimed  that  it  had  received  assurances  from  the  Uzbek 
authorities, given that the Government ‘did not submit a copy of any diplomatic assurances 
indicating that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment’, the Court held 
that his expulsion breached Article 3 ECHR.84 Therefore, in cases where the Contractin g 
States do not disclose the terms of the assurances to the Court, the Court does not consider 
the assurances as a relevant factor in the assessment of the risk. 85 The approach of the Court 
is to be applauded, as the Court has demonstrated that a Contractin g State cannot satisfy its 
obligations under Article 3 ECHR by merely claiming that it received assurances from the 
authorities of the receiving State. The assurances need to be examined by the Court itself and 
they also need to fulfil the Court’s criteria in order to be considered as adequate guarantees of 
safety. 
2.  Specific and explicit guarantees 
In examining the quality of the assurances given, the Strasbourg Court takes into account the 
content of the assurances.86 The Court in Saadi and other cases has raised the lack of specific 
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and explicit guarantees as a ground for rejecting the assurances.87 For example, in the case of 
Khaydarov v Russia that concerned planned extradition from Russia to Tajikistan, the Court 
found  the  letters  of  the  Tajikistani  authorities  to  be  insufficient  as  they  ‘contained  no 
reference whatsoever to the protection of the applicant from treatment proscribed by Article 3 
of  the  Convention’.88 Thus,  they  were  rejected  by  the  Court  as  they  lacked  explicit  and 
specific guarantees  against the subjection of the applicant to the proscribed treatment.  In 
contrast, the Court in the case of Othman found that the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) agreed between the United Kingdom Government and the Jordanian Government that 
provided, inter alia, that ‘[i]f arrested, detained or imprisoned following his return, a returned 
person  (…)  will  be  treated  in  a  humane  and  proper  manner,  in  accordance  with 
internationally accepted standards’, was specific and comprehensive.89 Given that the MoU 
addressed ‘directly the protection of the applicant’s Convention rights in Jordan’, it was not 
rejected by the Court.90 
Although the Strasbourg Court in  Saadi  made  it  clear  that  even  the  existence  of 
specific and explicit assurances  on their own would not  be sufficient to ensure adequate 
protection against the risk of torture and other ill-treatment, the Court seems to attach weight 
to the scope and content of the assurances. Even though the practical effect of the assurances 
is more important than their content, assurances which lack explicit and specific guarantees 
against  the  subjection  of  the  applicant  to  the  proscribed  treatment  are  rejected  by  the 
Strasbourg Court. Thus, although this factor may be of limited significance as regards the 
extent to which the assurances can be relied upon, the Strasbourg Court insists on seeking 
specific and explicit guarantees. 
3.  Legality of treatment 
A further factor considered by the Court is whether the assurances concern treatment in the 
receiving State that is legal or illegal.91 The case of Einhorn v France is illustrative of this 
point.92 This case concerned the extradition of an individual convicted of murder from France 
to the United States of America. 93 France obtained assurances from the authorities of the 
United States of America that the applicant would not be sentenced to death and therefore 
would not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR through exposure to the 
                                                 
87 Saadi (n 38) para 147; Khaydarov v Russia App no 21055/09 (ECtHR, 20 May 2010) para 111. 
88 Khaydarov (n 87) paras 18, 111. 
89 Othman (n 29) paras 77, 194. 
90 ibid para 194. 
91 ibid para 189. 
92 Einhorn v France (dec) App no 71555/01 (ECtHR, 16 October 2001). 
93 ibid paras 2, 10. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
45 
‘death-row phenomenon’.94 The Court, in assessing whether the assurances were sufficient to 
avert  the  risk  of  the  death  penalty  being  imposed,  paid  due  regard  to  the  fact  that  the 
imposition of the death penalty was not merely prohibited by the assurances themselves but 
that it was also prohibited by law.95 In this case, the offence of which the applicant st ood 
accused was committed before a statute restoring the death penalty in the particular federal 
State came into force.96 Given that Article 1 of the United States Constitution provided that a 
federal State must not pass an ex post facto law and given that  the United States Supreme 
Court held that a federal State must not ‘retrospectively impose a heavier penalty than was 
applicable at the time when the offence was committed’, the Court held that the assurances 
were sufficient to avert the risk as they guaranteed that which was also prohibited by law.97 
What emerges from the Strasbourg Court’s approach in the case of Einhorn is that 
when the assurances guarantee the protection of the applicant from treatment that is in the 
receiving State illegal, they will be deemed as sufficient guarantees of safety. Where the law 
itself  protects  the  applicant  from  subjection  to  the  proscribed  treatment,  the  assurances 
constitute  an  additional  safeguard  against  such  treatment.  Therefore,  the  approach  of  the 
Court  in  accepting  the  assurances  as  adequate  guarantees  of  safety  in  this  context  is 
reasonable and justified, given that a State that gives assurances not to do something which is 
also prohibited by law must uphold its promise. 
4.  The position and the authority of the provider of the assurances and Contracting 
States as providers of the assurances 
In assessing the practical effect of the assurances, the Strasbourg Court takes into account the 
position and the authority of the provider of the assurances.98 The case of  Baysakov and 
others v Ukraine illustrates this.99 In that case it was the First Deputy General Prosecutor of 
the  Republic  of  Kazakhstan  who  sent  to  the  Ukrainian  authorities  assurances  that  the 
applicants, if extradited to Kazakhstan, would not be subjected to ill -treatment.100 The Court 
found that the assurances were unreliable as ‘it was not established that the First Deputy 
Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan or the institution which he represented was empowered to 
provide such assurances on behalf of the State’.101 By contrast, in Othman, the Court found 
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that  the  MoU  concluded  between  the  United  Kingdom  Government  and  the  Jordanian 
Government was sufficient to remove any real risk of ill-treatment, given that it had been 
approved and supported by high-level officials of the Jordanian Government and by the King 
himself.102 Thus, the assurances were accepted as adequate guarantees in this case because 
they had been given by officials who were ‘capable of binding the Jordanian State’.103 
It  is  clear  therefore  that  the  Court  accepts  assurances  as  adequate  and  reliable 
guarantees only when they are given by high-level officials who are capable of binding the 
receiving  State.  However,  one  may  argue  that  even  if  they  are  given  by  such  persons, 
diplomatic assurances are not legally binding and thus, the receiving State would not have to 
abide  by  them. 104 Similarly,  opponents  of  the  diplomatic  assurances  policy  argue  that 
assurances are unreliable on the basis that they are given by States which breach their legally 
binding human rights obligations and would therefore fail to comply with their non -legally 
binding assurances.105 Such an argument was raised by a judge in the Canadian case of  Lai 
Cheong  Sing  and  others  v  the  Minister  of  Citizenship  and  Immigration,  who  questioned 
whether a State which is ‘not prepared to respect a higher legal instrument that it has signed 
and ratified (…) would (…) respect a lower-level instrument such as a diplomatic note’.106 
This was also one of the arguments that Othman raised in supporting his case before the 
Strasbourg Court.107 
Although assurances are usually given by States that breach their legally binding 
human rights obligations, it does not always follow that these States would also breach their 
non-legally binding assurances. This is because ‘diplomatic assurances may hold incentives 
for states to respect the promise given different from those connected to respecting their 
commitments  in  international  human  rights  law’. 108 Even  though  diplomatic  assurances 
impose less than a legal obligation, the State that gives the assurances would be more careful 
not to break its word in this context, given that its reputation as a bilateral collaborator would 
be seriously damaged in the case of breach and it also risks harming its diplomatic relations 
with the other State in issue.109 A negative impact on diplomatic relations, in turn, ‘may bring 
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economic and political consequences beyond those of a poor human rights record, and this 
threat is what can bring leverage to diplomatic assurances’.110 
Therefore, although diplomatic assurances are not legally binding and are often given 
by States that breach their legally binding human rights obligations, it does not follow that 
they are ineffective. They are given in a highly political context that makes States careful to 
uphold their promises, often making them reliable. In Othman the assurances were approved 
by the King himself and were provided by a Government ‘whose bilateral relations with the 
United Kingdom have, historically, been very strong’.111 As such, the Jordanian authorities 
would likely be more careful to ensure Othman’s proper treatment as his subjection to ill-
treatment would have a negative impact on Jordan’s relationship with the United Kingdom.112 
For these reasons, the Court accepted the assurances as adequate guarantees, even though the 
‘status of the MoU in Jordanian law’ was unclear.113 However, in cases such as Baysakov, 
where the assurances are given by individuals who are not capable of binding the receiving 
State, the assurances are correctly rejected by the Court. Given that such individuals do not 
have any interest in ensuring the enforcement of the assurances, the assurances are essentially 
empty promises. 
The Strasbourg Court adopts the same approach and accepts assurances as adequate 
guarantees of safety when they are given by a Member State of the Council of Europe and a 
Contracting Party to the Convention.114 This approach by the Court is correct given that a 
Member State of the Council of Europe and a Contracting State to the ECHR would be 
careful to uphold its promise on the ground that ‘a possible failure to respect such assurances 
would seriously undermine that State’s credibility’.115 Thus, this is another important factor 
in the assessment of the reliability of assurances. According to the Court, therefore, it is the 
political context in which the assurances are given that makes those assurances reliable. 
5.  Acceptance of assurances by local authorities 
By examining the above-mentioned cases of Baysakov and Othman, it has been made clear 
that  the  Court  accepts  assurances  as  adequate  guarantees  only  when  given  by  high-level 
officials who are capable of binding the receiving State. However, even if the assurances are 
given by high-level officials or by the central Government itself, it has to be further shown 
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that the local authorities are expected to abide by them.116 This point is well-illustrated in the 
case of Chahal v the United Kingdom which concerned the planned expulsion of Chahal from 
the United Kingdom to India on grounds of national security.117 
Although the assurances in this case had been given by the Indian Government itself, 
the Court found that they were unreliable as it was clear that the Indian security forces were 
not expected to abide by them. 118 Although the Court did not ‘doubt the good faith of the 
Indian Government in providing the assurances’, given that the violation of human rights by 
certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India was ‘a recalcitrant 
and enduring problem’, the Court was not persuaded that the assurances  in issue ‘would 
provide Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety’.119 This, however, was not the case 
in Othman. In the case of Othman the risk of ill-treatment emanated from the Jordanian 
General Intelligence Directorate (GID).120 The Court in that case  held that the assurances 
were sufficient to remove the risk of ill-treatment, as senior officials of the GID, from where 
the risk of ill-treatment emanated, approved and supported the assurances.121 
By accepting assurances as adequate guarantees only in cir cumstances in which the 
local authorities, in particular the security forces, are expected to abide by them, the Court 
has  demonstrated  its  insistence  on  the  ‘practical  effect’  criterion  and  it  has  managed  to 
discharge  the  often-raised  criticism  that  assurances  are  unreliable  because  they  will  not 
‘affect the behaviour of out-of-control security forces’.122 The Court in the case of Chahal 
made clear that even if the assurances are given by high-level officials or by the Government 
itself, if in practical terms they do not eliminate the risk of ill-treatment, they will be deemed 
inadequate.  Given  that  the  assurances  in  Chahal  were  basically  empty  promises,  as  the 
security forces from where the risk of ill-treatment emanated were not expected to abide by 
them, the Court was right in rejecting them.123 In contrast, given that the risk in the case of 
Othman emanated from the GID and senior officials of the GID approved and supported the 
assurances, the Court was right in accepting them as adequate guarantees.124 
 
                                                 
116 Othman (n 29) para 189. 
117 Chahal (n 1) para 25.  
118 ibid paras 37, 105. 
119 ibid para 105. 
120 Othman (n 29) paras 191-192. 
121 ibid para 195. 
122 Jones (n 68) 190. 
123 Chahal (n 1) para 105. 
124 Othman (n 29) para 195. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
49 
6.  The bilateral relations of the two States and the receiving State’s record in abiding 
by similar assurances 
As has been already mentioned in relation to Othman, the Court, in examining the practical 
effect of the MoU concluded between the United Kingdom Government and the Jordanian 
Government, took account of the fact that the assurances had been given by a Government 
‘whose bilateral relations with the United Kingdom have, historically, been very strong’.125 
The Court considered this factor again in Al-Moayad v Germany, a case that concerned the 
extradition of the applicant from Germany to the United States of America to face terrorism-
related charges.126 The applicant was extradited under the condition that he would not be 
detained in a facility outside the United  States of America where the interrogation methods 
were contrary to Article 3 ECHR. 127 The Court found that the assurances at issue were 
sufficient to avert the danger of subjection to interrogation methods proscribed by Article 3 
ECHR.128 In doing so, the Cour t focused on the length and strength of bilateral relations 
between the two States and the United States’ record in abiding by similar assurances.129 
Given that Germany had carried out a number of extraditions to the United States of America 
in reliance on assurances that it had found to be respected in practice, such assurances were 
found by the Court to be sufficient.130 
As noted, opponents of the diplomatic assurances policy often contend that assurances 
are given by States which are ‘known to torture’ and are therefore unreliable.131 The United 
States, for example, which provided assurances in  Al-Moayad, does not have ‘an entirely 
positive human rights record’, according to Alice Izumo.132 It does not however follow that in 
the particular circumstances of the case the assurances given by them could not be relied 
upon. Even though the United States’ human rights record might not be entirely positive, the 
Court determined that the assurances given by them would be respected in this particular 
case. The Court’s approach, which focuses on the context in which the assurances are given, 
seeks to ensure compliance. Given that Germany’s relationship with the United States had 
been strong in this context and given also that assurances had been respected by the relevant 
authorities in all extradition cases, the assurances given by them in this case could be relied 
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upon.  Thus,  although  the  assurances  are  usually  given  by  States  that  may  be  criticised 
regarding  their  human  rights  record,  the  Court  assesses  the  likelihood  of  compliance  by 
looking at the context in which they are given. 
7.  Examination of the assurances by domestic courts 
The Court in the case of Al-Moayad, in assessing the reliability of the assurances, also gave 
weight  to  the  fact  that  the  assurances  had  been  examined  by  the  German  courts.133 The 
German  courts  examined  the  assurances  given  by  the  United  States  of  America  and 
concluded that they could be relied upon. 134 This was taken into account by the Strasbourg 
Court.135 Similarly, in the case of  Othman, the Court paid due regard to the fact that the 
assurances in issue ‘withstood the extensive examination’ which had been carried out by an 
independent and domestic tribunal, being the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.136 
One may argue that the Court should not give a ny weight to the assessments carried out by 
the domestic courts of the sending Contracting States, given that the domestic courts may fail 
to make an objective assessment in their enthusiasm for deportations and deportations with 
assurances policy.137 However, given that the Court does not rely solely on the assessments 
carried out by the domestic courts of the sending Contracting States and examines the 
assurances itself, the assurances that are accepted as adequate guarantees are those which 
withstood the Court’s examination and which fulfilled the Court’s criteria for reliability. 
8.  Previous ill-treatment 
A further factor considered by the Court in assessing the practical effect of the assurances is 
whether the applicant had previously been ill-treated in the receiving State.138 The case of 
Koktysh v Ukraine, which concerned the planned extradition of the applicant from Ukraine to 
Belarus,  demonstrates  this.139 Although the authorities of Belarus gave assurances to the 
Ukrainian authorities that the applicant woul d not be tortured or ill -treated upon return to 
Belarus, the Court found that his extradition, if implemented, would constitute a breach of 
Article 3 ECHR.140 Given that the applicant had been previously ill-treated by the Belarusian 
authorities, the Court held that the assurances would not suffice to guarantee against the 
serious risk of ill-treatment, concluding that his extradition, if implemented, would constitute 
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a breach of Article 3 ECHR.141 The approach of the Court in this case is to be applauded as it 
demonstrates once again that even if the assurances are explicit and specific, as in the case of 
Koktysh, they would not be accepted as adequate guarantees against the risk of ill-treatment 
if, in practical terms based on past experiences, they are not sufficient to avert such risk.142 
9.   Effective system of torture prevention in the receiving State and engagement with 
human rights 
The Court will also consider whether there is an effective system of torture prevention in the 
receiving State, including whether it is willing to investigate allegations of torture and to 
punish those responsible and whether it is willing to co-operate with international monitoring 
mechanisms and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).143 For example, the Court in the 
case of Soldatenko v Ukraine raised the lack of international co-operation of the Turkmen 
authorities in the field of human rights, as well as the lack of an effective system of torture 
prevention in  Turkmenistan, as  grounds  for rejecting the assurances  given by them.144 In 
doing so, the Court paid heed to the report of the United Nations Secretary General in which 
he  expressed  concerns  about  the  categorical  denials  of  human  rights  violations  by 
Turkmenistan despite consistent information from reliable sources and about the r eluctance 
of  Turkmenistan  to  co-operate  with  the  United  Nations  treaty  monitoring  bodies  and 
NGOs.145 In light of these difficulties, the Court correctly concluded that it would be difficult 
to see whether such assurances would have been respected. 146 The Court was therefore right 
in rejecting them. 
10. Post-transfer monitoring mechanisms 
The assurances in the case of Othman were accepted by the Court as adequate guarantees 
partly due to the fact that they provided for monitoring mechanisms that could ensure and 
verify compliance with them.147 The Court, in concluding that the Adaleh Centre (a human 
rights organisation based in Jordan) was capable of verifying compliance with the assurances, 
took account of the fact that the Centre was independent from the Jordanian G overnment, as 
it was mainly funded by the government of the United Kingdom, and also of the fact that the 
Centre would have full access to Othman in prison for as long as he remained there. 148 Even 
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though the nature of torture makes compliance with assurances more difficult, the Court, by 
accepting assurances as adequate guarantees only when there are monitoring mechanisms in 
place that are capable of ensuring  compliance  with  them, has  managed to  discharge this 
criticism as regards the assurances that it accepts as adequate guarantees. For example, given 
that in Othman the Adaleh Centre could ensure Othman’s proper treatment by having full 
access to Othman in prison, the assurances were adequate guarantees.149 
Jeffrey  G Johnston  has  doubted the effectiveness  of  post-transfer monitoring  in 
ensuring and verifying compliance with assurances against torture. 150 In particular, he has 
contended that post-transfer  monitoring  is  ineffective,  given  that  torture  is  not  ‘easy  to 
detect’.151 Whilst this may be true, the assurances that are accepted by the Court are reliable 
because the monitoring mechanisms are subjected to a thorough examination by the Court. 
The effectiveness of the Adaleh Centre, for example, had been examined by the Court before 
concluding that it could ensure and verify compliance with the assurances. Key was the fact 
that  its  personnel  would  have  full  access  to  Othman  for  as  long  as  he  remained  in 
detention.152 Therefore, although assurances may be unreliable in some cases due to the 
ineffectiveness of post-transfer monitoring mechanisms, Johnston’s argument is not valid per 
se as regards the assurances accepted by the Court as adequate guarantees. 
11. Human rights situation in the receiving State 
As has already been explained, the Court in the case of Saadi held that the assurances given 
by the Tunisian authorities were unreliable, as, in practice, they could not eliminate the risk 
of ill-treatment, given the widespread use of torture in Tunisia.153 Even though the Court has 
stated that ‘it will only be in rare cases that the general situation in a country will mean that 
no weight at all can be given to assurances’, the Court in a number of cases since Saadi has 
given no weight at all to assurances from States where torture was endemic or persistent.154 
The Court in three similar cases found that the human rights situation in the receiving State 
excluded accepting any assurances whatsoever. In Sultanov v Russia, Yuldashev v Russia and 
Ismoilov  and  others  v  Russia  that  all  concerned  planned  extraditions  from  Russia  to 
Uzbekistan,  the  Court  gave  no  weight  at  all  to  the  assurances  given  by  the  Uzbek 
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authorities.155 Given that reliable sources described the practice of torture in Uzbekistan as 
systematic, the Court was not ‘persuaded that assurances from the Uzbek authorities offer a 
reliable guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment’.156 
The human rights reputation of the receiving State is, in some cases, a determinative 
factor  for  accepting  the  assurances,  rather  than  for  rejecting  them.  The  human  rights 
reputation of the United States, for example, was one of the factors that led the Court to 
conclude in the admissibility case of Babar Ahmad and others v the United Kingdom that the 
assurances at issue could be relied upon.157 The case concerned the planned extradition of 
individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism-related crimes from the United Kingdom 
to the United States of America.158 The Court, in considering the assurances given, accorded 
a presumption of good faith to the United States Government. 159 The Court noted that this 
good faith presumption arose out of the United States’ positive human rights record, given 
that it had a ‘long history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law’.160 As a 
result, the Court held that the applicants’ contention that the authorities of the United States 
of  America  might  designate  them  enemy  combatants  in  breach  of  their  assurances  was 
inadmissible.161 
The cases of Sultanov, Yuldashev and Ismoilov demonstrate the Court’s insistence on 
the ‘practical  effect’  criterion.  In cases  where the assurances  are  given by States ‘where 
torture is endemic or persistent’, and the assurances are therefore insufficient to avert the 
serious risk of ill-treatment, the Strasbourg Court has made it clear that they would not be 
accepted as adequate guarantees.162 In contrast, given that the assurances in the case of Babar 
Ahmad were obtained from the United States of America which, according to the Court, 
maintains  a  positive  human  rights  record,  they  were  accepted  as  adequate  guarantees.163 
Thus, the often-raised criticism  that assurances are unreliable because they are given by 
States which are ‘known to torture’ is not valid in the case of the Strasbourg Court, as the 
Court does not accept assurances from States where torture is endemic or persistent.164 
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E.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  examined  the  approach  of  the  Strasbourg  Court  to  diplomatic  assurances 
against  torture  and  other  ill-treatment.  It  has  been  argued  that  although  the  diplomatic 
assurances policy has been criticised for circumventing the absolute prohibition of torture and 
other  ill-treatment  on  the  basis  that  diplomatic  assurances  are  per  se  unreliable,  the 
Strasbourg Court, as a result of its pragmatic approach, has accepted those assurances which 
are adequate guarantees of safety. The Court seeks to ensure that the assurances it accepts as 
sufficient guarantees will be respected in practice. It does this by examining the reliability of 
assurances on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the circumstances of the case. It assesses 
not only their content, but also factors which are external to the assurances, such as the 
human  rights  situation  in  the  receiving  State  and  such  States’  human  rights  practices. 
Furthermore, by examining such a wide range of factors, the Strasbourg Court has implicitly 
highlighted that assurances must be able to withstand its extensive examination in order to be 
accepted  as  adequate  guarantees  of  safety.  Therefore,  the  Court  cannot  be  accused  of 
circumventing the absolute prohibition to be found in Article 3 ECHR as it accepts only the 
assurances that can remove the risk of torture and ill-treatment in practice. In other words, the 
Strasbourg Court has kept faith with the absolute prohibition of Article 3 ECHR as a result of 
this pragmatic approach. This approach has also allowed Contracting States to protect their 
national  security  from  criminal  acts  and  in  particular,  from  acts  of  terrorism,  without 
breaching their Article 3 ECHR obligations. In this respect, it can be argued that its approach 
is effective. 